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ABSTRACT 
"Judges should apply the law, not make it." That plea appears 
perennially in American politics. American legal scholars belittle it 
as a simple-minded demand that is silly and misleading. A glance 
beyond our shores dispels the notion that the American public IS 
naive to expect judges to apply rather than to make law. 
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American obsession with judicial lawmaking has its price: 
indifference to judicial law applying. If truth be told, practically we 
have no method for judges, as a matter of routine, to apply law to 
facts. Our failure leads American legal scholars to question whether 
applying law to facts is a necessary feature of civil procedure at all. 
German civil justice does have a method for routinely applying law 
to facts. It is called, in German, the "Relationstechnik," that is, in 
English, literally "relationship technique." This article introduces it 
to American lawyers and judges and shows how it helps make 
German civil justice effective. 
"Judges should apply the law, not make it." That plea appears 
perennially in American politics. I American legal scholars belittle it as a 
"simple-minded demand,,2 that is "silly and misleading.") It is, they 
suggest, a product of lay naIvete. "[E]very lawyer knows that judges 
make law-it's their job.,,4 That the plea finds resonance, however, is 
symptomatic of a popular perception of misalignment of civil justice with 
social goals. If law is not applied, but is left to judges to be made, it 
cannot be the expression of the people's social goals that it should be.5 
A glance beyond our shores dispels the notion that the American 
public is naIve to expect judges to apply rather than to make law. An 
Englishman, H.L.A. Hart, reminded U.S. jurists that "conventional legal 
1. Compare 2 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 502 (Robert Green McCloskey ed., 
1967) (1804) ("[E]very prudent and cautious judge ... will remember, that his duty and 
his business is, not to make the law, but to interpret and apply it.") with Press Release, 
George W. Bush, President Announces Judge John Roberts as Supreme Court Nominee, 
(July 19, 2005), available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/ 
releases/2005/07/20050719-7.html ("He will strictly apply the Constitution and laws, not 
legislate from the bench."). 
2. John J. Flynn, "Making Law" and "Finding Facts" - Unavoidable Duties of an 
Independent Judiciary, UTAH B.J., Aug. 6, 2005, at 6, 7, available at 
http://www . utahbar.orglbarj oumal/pdf/2005 july_august. pdf. 
3. Erwin Chemerinsky & Catherine Fisk, Judges Do Make Law-It's Their Job, 
USA TODAY, August 24, 2005, at IIA. 
4. Id. 
5. See, e.g., Justice Stephen J. Breyer, A Conversation on the Relevance of Foreign 
Law for American Constitutional Adjudication with U.S. Supreme Court Justices 
Antonin Scalia & Stephen Breyer (Jan. 13, 2005) (transcript available at 
http://domino.american.eduiAU/mediaimediarel.nsf/ I D265343BDC2189785256B81 007 
I F238/1F2F7DC4757FDOI E85256F890068E6EO?OpenDocument) ("The judge is to 
apply the law .... [R]emember, a judge is a person who's been entrusted in a democratic 
society with power, although that judge is not elected. So if in fact you give judges too 
many open-ended procedures, rules and practices, what you will discover is that a man, a 
woman who suddenly has this power, for better or for worse, maybe unconsciously, 
maybe not even wanting to, will substitute her judgment, his judgment, for the judgment 
of the legislature. And that's wrong in a democracy."). 
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thought in all countries conceives as the standard judicial function the 
impartial application of determinant existing rules in the settlement of 
disputes.,,6 Nowhere, except perhaps here in the United States, has the 
recognition that some judges, sometimes, make law, shaken the 
conventional idea that the standard function of civil litigation is applying 
law to facts. And even here, that shaken faith is a relatively recent 
development. 
American obsession with judicial lawmaking has its price: 
indifference to judicial law applying. We use our methods of applying 
law to facts-e.g., jury trials, summary judgments, and complaint 
screening-haphazardly rather than routinely. We rely on the parties' 
lawyers to determine the subject for decision rather than on judges. We 
depend upon those parties, rather than on courts, to invoke mechanisms 
for deciding. As a result, trials are vanishing, summary judgment 
motions are sporadic, and complaints are rarely reviewed by courts 
before service. It is said of American civil justice that the "highest goal 
is for courts not to apply law to facts.,,7 
If truth be told, practically we have no method for judges, as a 
matter of routine, to apply law to facts. Our abject failure leads 
American legal scholars to question whether applying law to facts is a 
necessary feature of civil procedure at all. In their view, process and 
participation in the process are primary; decisions that determine rights 
according to law are secondary, at best, and impossible to achieve, at 
worst. 
The Common Good Forum on the "Boundaries of Litigation" held 
last year at The Brookings Institution challenged us to "Imagin[e] New 
Structures of Civil Procedure." How can we do that? "Imagining" truly 
new structures of civil procedure is a daunting challenge beyond anyone 
person's capabilities. One way that we can imagine new systems without 
stretching our imaginations beyond the breaking point is to observe other 
legal systems. 
In this essay I discuss the German method of judicial application of 
law to facts. Our two societies and our two legal systems are sufficiently 
similar to make their experiences mutually relevant and informative. 
Above all, the two systems of civil justice are united by a common goal: 
"the fair, accurate and efficient vindication of private rights and interests 
based on the existing legal, political and social order."g 
6. H.L.A. Hart, American Jurisprudence Through English Eyes: The Nightmare 
and the Noble Dream, 11 GA. L. REv. 969,971 (1977). 
7. Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 989 (1987). 
8. PETER L. MURRAY & ROLF STORNER, GERMAN CIVIL JUSTICE 575 (2004). 
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German civil justice does have a method for routinely applying law 
to facts. It is called, in German, the "Relations-technik," that is, in 
English, literally "relationship technique.,,9 In this essay I introduce it to 
American lawyers and judges. After a brief presentation of the 
Relationstechnik, I show how it helps keep German civil justice-as 
Philip Howard might say-"sane,,,10 by guiding litigation. 
THE RELA TJONSTECHNIK OF ApPLYING LAW TO FACTS 
The syllogism is the basis of the Relationstechnik: the legal rule is 
the major premise, the facts are the minor premise, and the judicial 
decision is the logical conclusion. The Relationstechnik is taught to all 
future German judges and lawyers in court-provided training that takes 
place after conclusion of their university studies. The Relationstechnik is 
a product of more than a century of judicial practice. 
Two "bookends" of the Relationstechnik guide judges in applying 
law to facts: the legislatively-promulgated statute (das Gesetz) and the 
judicially written judgment (das Urteil). 
The statute is the fundamental concept of all German law. German 
statutes take the form of syllogistic norms. The major premise is that a 
legal consequence prescribed by statute applies when a generally 
described state of facts is present. The minor premise is that a particular 
state of facts fulfills the statutorily prescribed state of facts. 
The Relationstechnik works best when statutes in substance and 
form are good. Bad statutes make bad decisions. When statutes reflect 
prevailing conceptions of justice, the Relationstechnik is spared the 
tension of choosing between statutory rules and justice. II When statutes 
are well drafted, the Relationstechnik functions smoothly; hard cases are 
few, and easy cases are many. 
9. The Relationstechnik is little discussed in English. To my knowledge, until 
2004, the only work was Walter O. Weyrauch, The Art of Drafting Judgments: A 
Modified German Case Method, 9 J. LEGAL EDUC. 311 (1957). For two recent works, see 
also Christoph Engel, The Impact of Representation Norms on the Quality of Judicial 
Decisions 16 (Max Planck Inst. for Research on Collective Goods, Working Paper No. 
2004/13, 2004), available at http://www.mpp-rdg.mpg.de/pdCdat/2004_13online.pdf; 
Lutz-Christian Wolff, Structured Problem Solving: German Methodology from a 
Comparative Perspective, 14 LEGAL EDUC. REV. 19 (2003-2004), available at 
http://www.ler.edu.aulpdf/volumes/ler_vo1l4_1_2003_04.pdf. The paucity of English-
language treatments may be attributed to the fact that the method is principally taught at 
the courts in the practical training period of German legal education rather than in the 
university law faculty. 
10. See Philip K. Howard, Making Civil Justice Sane, CITY JOURNAL, Spring 2006, 
at 64. 
11. Article 20(3) of the German Constitution binds judicial decisions to "statute and 
justice" (Gesetz und Recht). GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Constitution] art. 20(3) (F.R.G.). 
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Well-drafted statutes coordinate well with each other. Well-drafted 
statutes make clear who may invoke them and what the consequences of 
their invocation are. Well-drafted statutes, to the extent possible, have 
judges find objective facts rather than make subjective valuings. Well-
drafted statutes do not expect judges to make political or other social 
policy decisions. While well-drafted statutes often require judges to 
value individual equities and find subjective facts such as state of mind, 
they minimize the use of such decisions to the extent they can. When 
they cannot avoid such decisions, they guide those decisions by setting 
boundaries and by giving examples. 
Statutes are not drafted well by accident. Most modem legal 
systems have a central office responsible for the technical quality of 
statutes. In Germany, preparation and perpetuation of good legislation is 
the raison d'etre of the Federal Ministry of Justice. 12 In that work, the 
Ministry engages some of the land's the best-qualified jurists: fonner 
appellate judges. 
While statutes guide law application, judgments validate their 
correct application. Judgments have four parts: (1) a caption that 
identifies the parties and the lawsuit ("Rubrum"); (2) a statement of the 
decision and of the relief ordered ("Tenor"); (3) a Tatbestand;13 and 
(4) the grounds for decision ("Entscheidungsgriinde"), hereafter referred 
to as the "justification." All four parts are subject to strict rules as to 
style. The first two parts need no explanation; the last two do. 
The Tatbestand is a short statement of the parties' legal claims and 
of their assertions of fact. It is not a finding of facts and thus is not an 
analogue to the findings of fact of an American bench decision. The 
Tatbestand should include: the subject matter of the lawsuit, a detailed 
sketch of the facts, but only insofar as is necessary to establish clearly the 
subject of the lawsuit, the evidence offered by the parties, the 
applications of the parties, relevant history of the lawsuit, and specific 
references to the file. It should not include: facts not necessary to the 
12. The Ministry's website identifies its central mission: "Law constitutes the 
foundation of our free democracy. Guaranteeing the rule of law and pursuing further 
refinements in this area is a central task of legal policy, and thus also of the Federal 
Ministry of Justice. The legislative work undertaken by the Ministry pursues this 
objective, and encompasses the preparation of new legislation as well as the amendment 
or repeal of existing laws." http://www.bmj.bund.de/enid/9fUca4S6efff7ed197073e2dd 
Sd372aS,OIMinistryIStructure_and_Organisation_14p.html. 
13. Tatbestand is a legal term which has no single English translation. Depending 
upon the context in which it appears, a different English translation is appropriate. In this 
essay, Tatbestand refers to a specific part of a German judgment that is so designated. 
There is no formal counterpart to the Tatbestand in an American judgment. To avoid 
inducing a false understanding, it is left here in the original German. Readers should note 
that this meaning is different from the Tatbestand of German criminal law, which might 
be translated "elements of the offense." 
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decision of the case, party statements made in the proceedings that are no 
longer relevant, legal arguments of the parties, statements of the law, or 
normative evaluations of the facts. 
The justification applies law to facts. It determines the facts of the 
Tatbestand and subsumes them under the abstract elements of the 
applicable rules. The process of applying law to facts is not a 
mechanical act of mindless processing, but a mindful act of creative 
evaluation. 
The justification follows a format that in clarity and brevity 
facilitates understanding. It begins by stating the result of the lawsuit 
and by identifying the determinative legal rule. It confirms or denies that 
the plaintiffs claim is permissible under procedural law and well-
founded in substantive law. For example, a typical justification might 
begin: "The plaintiffs action is in all respects permissible and well-
founded. Pursuant to § 488 Paragraph 1 Sentence 2 of the Civil Code the 
plaintiff has a right arising from the loan agreement of December 12, 
2007, to repayment of the loan of€75,000." 
The justification then proceeds to address systematically the 
applicable rule, its elements and, if the judgment denies plaintiffs 
claims, all rules that might support any of the claims. For each element 
of the rule, insofar as necessary, the justification clarifies the legal 
definition of the element as it relates to the particular case. Here the 
justification may interpret the applicable statute, but only to the extent 
directly relevant to determining whether the facts in the present case 
fulfill the elements of the statutory norm. Abstract discussions of law 
have no place. 
The justification then tells the factual story of the case. It focuses 
on those facts material to decision of the case. Immaterial facts have no 
place in the justification except as is necessary to understand the court's 
decision. The justification starts from undisputed facts. Where facts are 
disputed, the justification evaluates the evidence that leads the court to 
decide as it does. The justification does not discuss burden of proof 
other than with respect to material facts in dispute. 
Once the justification has clarified material and disputed facts, it 
subsumes those facts under the identified and clarified rule. 
The judgment certifies that the procedure has fulfilled constitutional 
guarantees. These guarantees include that every exercise of state power 
has been justified by and grounded in statute, that the parties were heard, 
and that the parties received equal treatment under law. The judgment is 
an act of an impartial and impersonal public authority furnishing the 
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official and objective interpretation and application of law. 14 It helps 
parties understand why the court decided as it did. Ideally it convinces 
losing parties that the outcome is legally correct; at a minimum, it 
demonstrates that the process was rational. 
THE GERMAN JUDGMENT AS "NARRATIVE" 
Recent American writing on civil procedure conceptualizes 
contemporary American trials as a form of narrative, or more accurately, 
as a form of presentation of "two competing narratives. . . where an 
'either-or' choice will have to be made." The narrative is how we 
"actually organize and analyze the vast amounts of information involved 
in making a legal judgment.,,15 In this terminology, the German 
judgment is the narrative of German civil proceedings. 
The difference between German and American proceedings 
narrative-wise is that the German judgment presents "the standard 
narrative historiography, where there exists a single account of 
events ... ," while contemporary American proceedings present two fully 
formed and competing narratives at trial that have been developed 
pretrial. No wonder, then, that German civil procedure is more efficient 
than is its American counterpart; where American proceedings write two 
screenplays and produce both screenplays jointly in one trial, German 
civil procedure records only one report for posterity and does not even 
bother to dramatize it. While the German cinema is poorer for the 
paucity of scripts, the German legal system is richer in determinations of 
right. 
The efficiency of German civil procedure does not end in it making 
one unproduced screenplay do where American procedures create and 
produce two. The monopoly position of the German narrative avoids the 
excesses of competing narratives. The German narrative focuses on that 
which is legally material. It does not battle for the reader's imagination. 
It does not bring into its story legally immaterial, but humanly appealing, 
detail. It does not leave out legally material matters that do not 
contribute to its justification. It is concerned with the validity of its 
conclusions. It has no cause to seek deconstruction of a competing 
version of events on grounds unrelated to the validity of those 
conclusions. 
14. See Reinhard Zimmermann, Characteristic Aspects o/German Legal Culture, in 
I INTRODUCTION TO GERMAN LAW, 26-27 (Mathias Reimann & Joachim Zekoll eds., 
2005). 
15. Robert P. Bums, The Distinctiveness o/the Trial Narrative, in I THE TRIAL ON 
TRIAL: TRUTH AND DUE PROCESS 157 (Anthony Duff et aI., eds., 2004). 
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The writer of the narrative in German civil procedure is the judge. 
The judge is assigned the task to write the story of whether the plaintiff 
has established facts that fulfill all of the elements of a statutory right. 
The parties provide the judge with the materials the judge needs for that 
work. The goal of their cooperation is a decision according to law. The 
individual elements required by statute to establish a claim are the 
"spectacles" through which the judge views the case. What the judge 
can see through the spectacles matters; everything else is immaterial. 16 
The "sporting theory of justice" is no model for German court 
proceedings; there is no trial by battle between competing champions. 
There is little theater, ceremony is sparing, courtrooms are modest and 
judges preside from an altitude of a few inches rather than from a height 
of a couple of feet. Parties and their attorneys talk directly with the 
judge and with each other. The atmosphere is more cooperative and less 
confrontational than that of their American counterparts. German court 
proceedings resemble joint projects such as assembling a jigsaw puzzle, 
completing a crossword puzzle or conducting a scavenger hunt. The 
principal difference between these joint activities and German court 
proceedings is that in court one party wants to establish that one piece is 
necessarily missing! 
THE RELATIONSTECHNIK AS GUIDE TO ApPLYING LAW TO FACTS 
The Relationstechnik bounds legal proceedings without strait-
jacketing them. It avoids the two extremes of American civil procedure: 
the single-issue focus of historic common law special pleading and the 
legally unfocused narrative of contemporary notice pleading. It brings 
about issue narrowing without cutting off the right to be heard. The 
"golden rule" of German civil justice is that there are no surprise 
decisions. 17 We discuss here four of the ways in which the 
Relationstechnik sets boundaries to litigation and keeps civil justice 
aligned with social goals: (1) reviewing the complaint for plausibility 
before serving; (2) case structuring through issue framing; (3) focusing 
witness testimony; and (4) deferring issue deciding. 
16. JOACHIM HRUSCHKA, DIE KONSTITUTION DES RECHTSFALLES: STUDIEN ZUM 
VERHALTNIS VON TATSACHENFESTSTELLUNG UND RECHTSANWENDUNG 23-24 (1965). 
17. Helmut RiiBmann, Grundregeln der Relationstechnik (Jan. 14, 2005), 
http://ruessmann.jura.uni-sb.delzpo2004Noriesungirelationstechnik.htm. 
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(1) Reviewing the Complaint for Plausibility before Serving 
The Relationstechnik together with the cost system18 help keep 
lawsuits that are unfounded in fact or law or that are procedurally 
defective from being served on, and thus from disturbing, potential 
defendants. The plaintiff begins a lawsuit by filing a complaint with the 
court. Before the court serves the complaint on the defendant, it assigns 
the case to a judge who makes a preliminary review of the complaint for 
procedural prerequisites and other patent deficiencies. Already at this 
stage the Relationstechnik anticipates the judgment that is to come. The 
plaintiff must plead a case that has a plausible chance of success. While 
the plaintiff need not plead the legal basis on which the complaint rests, 
the plaintiff must plead facts upon which relief could be granted. 
Moreover, the plaintiff must plead the proof that the plaintiff intends to 
rely upon to prove the factual assertions, i.e., the plaintiff must 
"substantiate" the complaint's factual allegations. A properly 
substantiated complaint includes all material documents in the plaintiffs 
possession, designates all material documents in the possession of others, 
and identifies the testimony on which the plaintiff plans to rely. It should 
state the facts so exactly that, based on the information provided, the 
court could determine that the claimed legal relief should be granted. 
The judge's preliminary review of the complaint impels plaintiffs' 
counsel to ground complaints in existing law and in facts that counsel has 
a reasonable chance of proving. The expectation of preliminary review 
helps deter frivolous complaints. Yet that review should not deter many 
meritorious complaints, since plaintiffs do not plead at their peril. 
Should the judge have concerns about whether the procedural 
prerequisites are met, or about whether the complaint sufficiently 
substantiates the factual allegations, the judge is to direct the plaintiff to 
clarify the point before dismissing the case. 19 Moreover, while it is the 
plaintiffs responsibility to plead the facts, it is up to the judge to know 
the law and to identify the applicable legal rule. In Germany, as in other 
civil law countries, the maxims jura novit curia (the court knows the 
law) and da mihi factum, dabo tibi ius (give me the facts, I will give you 
the law) apply. So long as there is any legal rule that would support 
relief on the facts alleged, the judge is to direct service of the complaint. 
The plaintiffs incorrect choice of rule is of no moment. 
18. In Gennany, the loser pays. Zivilprozessordnung [ZPO][Civil Procedure 
Statute] Jan. 30,1877, § 91, ~ I. 
19. See Michael Bohlander, The German Advantage Revisited: An Inside View of 
German Civil Procedure in the Nineties, 13 TuL. EUR. & CIv. L.F. 25, 33 (1998); MURRAY 
& STORNER, supra note 8, at 210. 
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Once the judge directs service and the defendant is served, the 
defendant is required to answer the complaint. The defendant's answer 
is subject to requirements similar to those governing the complaint: it 
must be true, complete, specific, and substantiated. 
(2) Case Structuring through Issue Framing 
Coincident with the preliminary review, the judge determines how 
the case is to proceed further, whether the case will use additional written 
proceedings or will use a so-called early first hearing. The judge's 
choice is purely pragmatic; the judge selects the method that the judge 
thinks is most likely to be more efficient in the case. A party dissatisfied 
with the choice may request that the judge use the other method, in 
which case the party should state why the party believes that the other 
method would be more efficient. The determinant of efficiency is 
ordinarily which method is more likely to simplify and hasten framing of 
the material and disputed issues. The judges with whom I have spoken 
have told me that most judges prefer an early oral hearing in contested 
cases. 
Prior to the first hearing, or the exchange of further written 
pleadings, as the case may be, the judge is required to prepare for the 
future proceedings. Preparations may include: (1) directing the parties 
to supplement their pleadings, (2) directing government authorities to 
provide information and documents, (3) ordering the personal 
appearance of the parties, (4) summoning witnesses named by a party to 
the hearing, and (5) ordering the production of documents or tangible 
things and making premises available for observation. In some cases, 
based on these preparations, it is possible to resolve the entire case at the 
first hearing. 
In this stage the judge structures the lawsuit without finally deciding 
anything. The judge works with the parties to identify those issues that 
both are material to plaintiff's claims and that are in dispute. This early 
structuring of the case through issue framing plays an important role in 
keeping German civil justice within bounds. It identifies the legal rules 
under consideration for application, the elements of those rules, and the 
evidence necessary to establish the elements of each rule. The judge 
points out weaknesses to the parties in their particular claims and 
inquires of them how they plan to meet those claims. 
Structuring the case and framing issues not only guides the judge in 
subsequent consideration of the case, it also helps the parties reach a 
settlement of the case more expeditiously and reasonably. The parties 
can see which rules will determine the decision and which facts are 
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needed. Some judges told me that they consider structuring one of their 
most important judicial duties. 
To an American accustomed to very formal exchanges between 
judge and counsel, the early first hearing to clarify issues is remarkable. 
By American standards, these hearings are intensely interactive, 
comparatively cooperative, and informa1.20 They resemble American 
pretrial conferences more than American trials. They differ from 
American pretrial conferences, however, in important ways. Most 
remarkable from an American perspective is the role of the parties. 
Typically the judge summons the parties themselves to the early first 
hearing and speaks directly with them. These hearings are neither 
American-style discovery nor American-style tria1.21 Their focus is on 
identifying material issues of fact that are actually in dispute between the 
parties; it is not on uncovering unknown facts, or on proving known 
ones, or on possible presentation of a narration later.22 The judge probes 
the potential claims and the facts needed to support the claims. In 
essence, the judge turns to the concerned party and the party's attorney 
and asks: "Now on this issue are you seriously going to dispute the 
fact?" 
What prevents the party or the party's attorney from responding: so 
let the other side prove it? The German Code of Civil Procedure 
("ZPO"). ZPO § 138 imposes on parties a duty of cooperation in 
clarifying the issues in the case. ZPO § 138(1) requires the parties to 
give their declarations concerning factual circumstances completely and 
truthfully; ZPO § 138(2) requires that they state their positions with 
respect to the facts asserted by the opponent. These discussions are not 
evidentiary. They do not constitute taking testimony of the parties. They 
amount to clarification of the factual assertions of the parties that are 
necessary for the eventual application of the law to the facts. ZPO 
§ 138(3) provides that an asserted fact will be treated as admitted if the 
other party is silent and fails to contest it. ZPO § 138(4) provides that 
only in limited circumstances does a declaration of lack of knowledge 
serve to put a matter in dispute. Moreover, ZPO § 138(2) is interpreted 
20. Murray and StUmer describe them at some length. MURRAY & STORNER, supra 
note 8, at 256-59. 
21. See, e.g., Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., American Law Institute Study on Paths to a 
"Better Way": Litigation Alternatives, and Accommodation: Background Paper, 1989 
DUKE L.J. 824, 854 n.l09 (incorrectly so characterizing the hearing). 
22. Cf Frederick D. Wells, A Justice Factory, JUSTICE THROUGH SIMPLIFIED LEGAL 
PROCEDURE, 73 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOc. SCI. 196, 202 (1917): 
The court could practically say: "Now on this issue are you seriously going to 
dispute the fact? As a reasonable man, are you denying it?" If he answers 
"Perhaps it is so, but, let the other side prove it," it ought to be possible for the 
court to throw his technical objections out of the window. 
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to require that a mere denial of fact is not sufficient to put a fact in 
dispute. A party in most cases must explicitly contest the fact asserted, 
and if the fact asserted is known or could be known to the party, then the 
party must substantiate its contrary contention with facts known to it. 
Thus, if in the course of the hearing or in the pleadings, one party admits 
a fact asserted by the other, there is no need to prove the fact. In 
relatively short order the judge can inform the parties of the applicable 
legal rules and get their agreement on which matters of fact are material 
to those rules and are in dispute. 
(3) Focusing Witness Testimony 
Thanks to such structuring, many cases conclude without oral 
testimony of witnesses ever being necessary. Judges I spoke with 
estimated that this may be true of well more than half of all cases filed. 
Where witness testimony is taken, framing issues helps focus and 
expedite the testimony that is taken. 
When it comes to taking the testimony of witnesses, German civil 
justice is just-in-time justice. The judge takes evidence only on party 
request and only after the judge so orders.23 The judge is to order taking 
evidence only when necessary to convince the judge of the truth or 
untruth of a particular fact that is disputed by the parties and that is 
material to the judge's decision of the case. Thus, the judge should not 
take evidence to prove undisputed facts, facts generally known to the 
judge, facts presumed by statute to be true until the contrary is proven, 
favorable facts established by the other party's submissions, disputed 
main facts established by undisputed facts, disputed facts the truth of 
which the judge is convinced of without taking evidence, and facts not 
necessary for the judgment (e.g., two alternatives for granting relief are 
allowed and one is already acknowledged). 
The judge's control of evidence taking does not, however, prevent 
parties from insisting on taking evidence that they believe is relevant to 
deciding material issues in dispute. German judges told me that one of 
the surest ways to ensure that a lower court is reversed on appeal is to 
reject an application to take evidence without strong justification. Such 
refusal counts as a violation of the judge's ZPO § l39 duty of elucidation 
discussed in the next subsection. 
23. John Langbein has written eloquently of The German Advantage in Civil 
Procedure, 52 u. CHI. L. REv. 823 (1985). His main theme is that "by assigning judges 
rather than lawyers to investigate the facts, the Germans avoid the most troublesome 
aspects of our practice." /d. at 824. His article led to a flurry of discussion that has 
continued over twenty years. A recent review can be found in Bradley Bryan, Justice 
and Advantage in Civil Procedure: Langbein's Conception of Comparative Law and 
Procedural Justice in Question, II TULSA J. COMPo & INT'L L. 521, 523 (2004). 
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(4) Deferring Final Decision of Issues 
Case structuring and issue framing work as powerful tools for 
promoting efficient conduct of civil justice because German judges can 
and do defer final decisions of individual aspects of cases until they are 
prepared to decide the case as a whole. German judges decide no issues 
before their time.24 The critical moment in a German lawsuit is how law 
applies to facts as of the last oral hearing. German parties do not have to 
commit irrevocably early in the lawsuit to a single theory of the case. 
While judges are authorized to reject evidence for being offered too late, 
and often do that, their enthusiasm for such expediting measures is 
tempered by their ever-present ZPO § 139 duty of elucidation which 
assures the parties their constitutional right to be heard guaranteed by the 
German Constitution.25 ZPO § 139 is a far-reaching prescription that the 
judge thoroughly discuss all aspects of the case with the parties. It 
completely rules out trial by ambush. ZPO § 139(2) requires that the 
judge call to a party's attention and give the party an opportunity to 
comment on any non-trivial issue that the party has apparently 
overlooked or has considered insignificant or where the judge's 
understanding of the point of fact or law differs from the understanding 
of the parties. 
German civil procedure seeks in this way to sequence issue deciding 
in a manner that is both efficient and just. In many cases, the applicable 
legal rule can not simply be read from the statute. Instead, it is often it 
necessary to search the statute for the rule, to compare the rule to the 
facts, to revisit the statute in light of the facts, and to examine the facts 
again in light of the rules. This process of going back and forth was 
identified in the first part of the twentieth century and has since assumed 
a place in the description oflaw application in Germany?6 
AMERICAN REFLECTIONS ON THE GERMAN RELATIONSTECHNIK 
The ideals that undergird the German Relationstechnik are no 
strangers to American civil justice. For much of the 20th century the 
Canons of Judicial Ethics of the American Bar Association stated as a 
tenet of the rule of the law that the judge's "duty is the application of 
24. Paul Masson advertising slogan "We will sell no wine before its time." See, e.g., 
Paul Masson Commercial Featuring Orson Welles, available at http://www.youtube.coml 
watch?v=bpjOt2ozPWY (last visited Sept. 19,2009). 
25. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Constitution] art. I 03 (F.R.G.). 
26. See OSKAR HARTWIEG & HANS ALBRECHT HESSE: DIE ENTSCHEIDUNG 1M 
ZIVILPROZESS: EIN STUDIENBUCH OBER METHODE, RECHTSGEFUHL UNO ROUTINE IN 
GUT ACHTEN UNO URTEIL 78-79 (1981) (Die Lehre vom Pendelblick). 
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general law to particular instances.,,27 The idea that civil procedure 
should guide deciding anchored our civil justice system throughout the 
19th century. Stephen on Pleading, the most often printed of all one 
volume treatises on civil procedure of that century, famously begins: "In 
the course of administering justice between litigating parties there are 
two successive objects,-to ascertain the subject for decision, and to 
decide.,,28 Proponents of narrative litigation acknowledge that even 
today the received view of the American trial describes an underlying 
substance29 that seems to me scarcely different from the 
Relationstechnik: (1) construct an accurate, value-free account of what 
occurred, (2) fairly categorize whether that account fits within the 
substantive law, and (3) deliver a verdict that the party with the burden of 
proof has established each of the elements of the claim. 
American civil procedure has, however, never enjoyed the success 
of the German Relationstechnik. It has swung from one extreme to the 
other-from allowing parties to dispute only one point of law or fact, as 
was the case in common law special pleading, to allowing parties to put 
forth all manner of claims constrained only slightly by statutory law. To 
keep the trial in bounds and to prevent unfair surprise, special pleading 
precluded parties from addressing all but one issue. To remedy the ills 
that followed from premature issue narrowing, the system introduced 
contemporary discovery to assure that parties did not narrow issues with 
incomplete knowledge. But the cure was worse than the ill; few cases 
can support complete discovery. 
The inability of American civil procedure to narrow issues without 
cutting off consideration of matters later found to be material has 
rendered American civil procedure a failure. Contemporary American 
27. CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS, Canon 20 (1924). From 1924 to 1972 the 
American Bar Association's Canon 20 provided: 
A judge should be mindful that his duty is the application of general law to 
particular instances, that ours is a government of law and not of men, and that 
he violates his duty as a minister of justice under such a system if he seeks to 
do what he may personally consider substantial justice in a particular case and 
disregards general law as he knows it to be binding on him. 
[d. These canons remained in force until the Code of Judicial Conduct was adopted 
August 16, 1972. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Preface (1990). 
28. HENRY JOHN STEPHEN, A TREATISE ON THE PRINCIPLES OF PLEADING IN CIVIL 
ACTIONS I (Philadelphia, Abraham Small, 1824). The first American edition appeared in 
the year of the first edition in London, 1824. Before the Civil War, there were six 
subsequent editions by Francis J. Troubat. After the Civil War there were many more 
editions by different editors, among them one by that icon of the common law, Samuel 
Williston in 1895. Other editions included those by Franklin Fiske Heard (1867), Samuel 
Tyler (multiple editions from 1871 to 1919), and James DeWitt Andrews (multiple 
editions 1894-190 I). It was epitomized in other books. It was the 19th century 
American guide to common law pleading. The last American edition appeared in 1924. 
29. Bums, supra note IS. 
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civil justice cannot do efficiently and justly that which the public rightly 
expects of it: apply law to facts to detennine rights. 
Common law special pleading and contemporary discovery have 
one thing in common: both rely on the good will of the parties' attorneys 
to narrow the issues. Problematic in any system, such an approach is 
especially dubious in an adversary system, particularly in an adversary 
system such as has developed in the United States, where the bar is 
diverse and open rather than limited and closed as it had been in 
England. 
When the nineteenth century refonners contemplated abolition of 
common law pleading, some also contemplated shifting responsibility for 
issue narrowing from the parties to a neutral magistrate as in classical 
Roman law. Aware of the possibility, but apparently not familiar with a 
working system of such narrowing, they hesitated to import a "foreign 
style of architecture." Instead, they chose to try first to "build with old 
materials and after the old fashions.,,3o They tried. April 12, 2008, was 
the 160th anniversary of New York legislature's adoption of the Field 
Code. It is still the symbolic cornerstone of the rickety system we have 
today. Six generations of failure are enough; it is time for change. 
Knowledge of Gennan Relationstechnik should infonn that change.31 
30. See, e.g., REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONERS ApPOINTED To REVISE AND REFORM 
THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE COURT OF JUSTICE IN THIS COMMONWEALTH (1851), reprinted in 
2 A MEMOIR OF BENJAMIN ROBBINS CURTIS WITH SOME OF HIS PROFESSIONAL AND 
MISCELLANEOUS WRITING 159 (Benjamin R. Curtis, Jr. ed., 1879). 
31. The acceptance of special pleading in 19th century America dispels the idea that 
present-day story-writing procedures are mandated by the constitutional requirement of 
trial by jury. All that the Constitution requires is a jury trial of disputed issues of material 
fact. For the place of the Relationstechnik in German civil procedure generally, see 
JAMES R. MAXEINER, GYOOHO LEE & ARMIN WEBER, PRACTICAL GLOBAL CIVIL 
PROCEDURE: UNITED STATES, GERMANY & KOREA (forthcoming 2010). 
*** 
